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Executive Summary 
 
This paper estimates the effect on international trade flows during the 1990s of 
the formation of the vitamins cartel. After this cartel began operating, exports from 
countries where the cartel conspirators’ headquarters were located to those nations in 
Asia, Western Europe, and Latin America that did not have active cartel enforcement 
regimes tended to rise in value more than in those nations that had such regimes. As 
industry studies suggest that the demand for vitamins is price inelastic, this finding is 
supportive of the hypothesis that the vitamins cartel raised prices further in nations 
without active cartel enforcement regimes. These findings also have implications for 
the cost-benefit analyses of anti-cartel laws. In nine economies in Western Europe and 
Latin America, where recent estimates of government outlays on competition policy 
enforcement were found, these expenditures were compared to the additional 
overcharges on vitamins imports that would have resulted if each of these nations did 
not have an active cartel enforcement regime. In seven of the nine economies, the 
reduction in overcharges on this one international cartel alone exceeded a quarter of 
their government’s spending on the entire competition policy enforcement regime. 
These findings have a direct bearing on the debate, currently taking place at the World 
Trade Organization, on the merits of multilateral disciplines that would require all 
WTO members to enact and enforce provisions against hard core cartels.1 
 
The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws: 
Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel 
 
Julian L. Clarke and Simon J. Evenett 
 
1. Introduction 
During the 1990s the European Commission and the United States’ 
Department of Justice between them prosecuted over forty cartels that involved 
private firms and whose effects went beyond national borders. These private 
international cartels were found in a wide range of products – from citric acid, 
vitamins, newsprint, and fax paper to shipping and chemicals such as aluminium 
phosphide and sodium gluconate.
1 Furthermore, these cartels tended not to collapse 
under the weight of their own incentive problems, as 24 of them lasted at least four 
years. The latter fact suggests that market forces alone may be unable to quickly 
undermine attempts to fix prices, rig bids, allocate quotas and market shares; perhaps 
implying a potential role for national anti-cartel enforcement. 
The large number of cartels being unearthed in the European Union and the 
United States has not gone unnoticed in the rest of the world and competent 
authorities in other jurisdictions are increasing their cartel enforcement efforts. For 
example, submissions to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) provide details of recent anti-cartel enforcement actions by 
developing economies.
2 Moreover, many nations established competition authorities 
in the 1990s. The recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)’s  Directory of Competition Authorities now contains entries for 93 
nations and three supranational entities (the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
the European Commission, and Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine).
3 
Given that anti-cartel laws tend to be one of the first competition measures to be 
enacted by national authorities, these figures suggest that there is substantial 
legislative support—if not necessarily the capacity—for cartel enforcement. 
These observations prompt a number of research questions whose answers 
may have implications for policymakers. First, what is the impact of these
                                                 
1 See S. J. Evenett, M. C. Levenstein & V. Suslow, International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 
1990s, WORLD ECONOMY, September 2001, at Table 1. 
2 Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels under National 
Competition Laws, OECD (2002).  
3 Directory of Competition Authorities, UNCTAD (2002).    2 
 
 international cartels on prices and quantities sold in different nations’ markets and on 
international trade flows? Second, how large are the rents created by international 
cartels? Third, to what extent—if at all—do cartel members take into account the 
potential for future enforcement actions by national competition authorities when 
planning and executing their agreements to distort market 
outcomes? This latter question might shed light on the deterrent effects of national 
anti-cartel laws and on the potential impact of adopting such a law. This set of 
questions, which is not exhaustive, highlights the impact of international cartels and 
cartel enforcement on market outcomes; and should be distinguished from questions 
associated with the jurisprudence of anti-cartel laws and related legal matters. As will 
become clear, the focus of this paper is on the quantitative impact of one major 
international cartel—that of vitamins—leaving to others the task of tackling the 
complex legal issues raised by cartel enforcement. 
The international vitamins cartel operated from 1989 to 1999 and involved 
producers located in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United States. Using international trade data from 1985 to 1999, 
and after taking into account the other plausible determinants of trade in vitamins, this 
paper examines whether the formation of this cartel had effects on international trade 
flows in vitamins that differed across distinct types of importing nations. This paper is 
especially interested in evaluating the hypothesis that, while a cartel is in operation, 
the conspirators will tend to raise prices less in those destinations with active cartel 
enforcement regimes. This hypothesis could be rationalized in the following manner: 
Cartel members will weigh the gains from a further increase in prices in a given 
nation’s market with the increase in the probability that such a price increase will 
result in enforcement action that, in turn, could lead to financial and other penalties. 
In principle, an antitrust authority could notice high (or rising) prices of the cartelized 
product and begin an investigation. Another—perhaps more likely—channel is that 
buyers of the cartelized product are more likely to make a complaint to an antitrust 
authority the more the price of vitamins is raised above pre-cartel levels. The 
constraint—if any—that a nation’s cartel enforcement regime is likely to place on the 
pricing behavior of cartel members will depend on a number of factors including the 
ability of the antitrust authorities to collect the relevant evidence, the incentives such 
an authority has to encourage private firms to come forward with evidence, the  
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strength of any penalties for cartelization that the nation’s law allows for and, where 
relevant, the likelihood that a nation’s courts will convict cartel conspirators.  
Another argument is relevant in the international context. In those nations 
where announcements about cartel investigations and prosecutions are closely 
watched by other nations’ enforcement authorities, cartel members may well 
deliberately reduce their price increases or may well avoid cartelization altogether. 
Such cartel members may prefer to stay “under the radar screen” in jurisdictions with 
stronger cartel enforcement regimes so as to reduce the probability of triggering an 
investigation by another nation’s antitrust authority; and quietly get on with raising 
prices in nations with weaker cartel enforcement regimes. For both reasons, one might 
expect the cartel’s formation to result in price increases—and, if demand for the 
cartelized product is inelastic, in increases in the total value of cartelized exports—
that are smaller in jurisdictions that have active cartel enforcement regimes. 
This paper presents evidence that, after the formation of the vitamins cartel, 
exports from countries where the cartel conspirators’ headquarters were located to 
those nations in Asia, Western Europe, and Latin America that did not have active 
cartel enforcement regimes tended to rise in value more than in those nations that had 
such regimes. Given that industry studies suggest that the demand for vitamins is 
price inelastic, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the vitamins cartel 
raised prices more in nations without active cartel enforcement regimes. These 
findings also have implications for the cost-benefit analyses of anti-cartel laws. In 
nine economies in Western Europe and Latin America, where recent estimates of 
government outlays on competition policy enforcement were found, these 
expenditures were compared with the additional overcharges on vitamins imports that 
would have resulted if each of these nations did not have an active cartel enforcement 
regime. In seven of the nine economies the reduction in overcharges on this one 
international cartel alone exceeded a quarter of their government’s spending on the 
entire competition policy enforcement regime. 
The analysis in this paper departs from the existing literature in a number of 
respects. Unlike First’s article,
4 which described the vitamins cartel in illuminating 
detail, this analysis is quantitative and not qualitative. The approach taken here 
focuses on the implications for international trade flows of international cartels, and  
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so does not examine how within-border (domestic) transactions are affected by 
cartelization.
5 Third, the approach employs econometric tools to identify what impact 
cartel laws have on the export decisions of cartel members. Fourth, unlike the paper 
by Levenstein and Suslow
6 which calculates the effects of international cartelization 
at a point in time, this paper estimates the impact of the vitamin cartel’s formation on 
trade flows throughout the 1990s.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section 
summarizes the recent discussions on international cartels in leading international fora 
and highlights how economic research might shed light on a number of the issues 
being addressed there. The third section summarizes the main features of the 
international vitamins cartel. The fourth section presents an empirical analysis of the 
effects of the formation of the vitamin cartel on international trade flows and draws 
out some of the implications for assessing the costs and benefits of active cartel 
enforcement. Concluding remarks appear in the fifth section. 
 
2.  A Selective Overview of The Ongoing Discussions on International 
Competition Policy (Especially as they Relate to International Cartels)  
Understanding the effects of international cartels on market outcomes has 
some bearing on certain long-standing debates in international fora about the effects 
of large companies’ operations and about the merits of adopting international 
disciplines on competition policy. As is often pointed out, one can go back to the 
debates surrounding the Havana Charter in the 1940s to see concerns raised about the 
potential for the benefits of international trade reform to be eroded by anticompetitive 
practices. Moreover, concerns about “restrictive business practices” led the United 
Nations General Assembly to adopt on 5 December 1980 a Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices. This “Set” was renewed in 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000; highlighting 
recurring concerns by some policymakers about the effects of restrictive business 
practices, of which cartels are a leading example. Many (notably US-based) scholars 
                                                                                                                                            
4 H. First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law, 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, 711-729 (2001). 
5 See JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 
(Kluwer Academic Publishing 2001). See also Lawrence J. White, Lysine and Price Fixing: How 
Long? How Severe?, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2001). 
6 M. C. Levenstein & V. Suslow, Private International Cartels and the Effect on Developing Countries, 
Background Paper for the World Development Report (2001).  
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and officials are, and have been, skeptical about the pervasiveness and effects of 
restrictive business practices in international commerce; a presumption that was easy 
to sustain when there was little available research on contemporary international 
cartels. It is, therefore, significant that there have been a number of recent attempts to 
quantify the effects of cartels that have had international effects
7 and this paper can be 
thought of as part of this recent research program. 
In the 1990s the members of the OECD also gave growing attention to what are 
often referred to now as hard core cartels.
8 Discussions at the OECD covered a wide 
variety of aspects of anti-cartel enforcement and laws; including the severity of 
sanctions, the role of leniency programs, and the nature and extent of current and 
potential future international cooperation in anti-cartel enforcement. These 
discussions, which now routinely include non-OECD members, have added greatly to 
the body of knowledge on cartel enforcement and have provided an opportunity for 
best practices to be discussed and ideas exchanged. Moreover, on 25 March, 1998, the 
OECD Council approved a Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against 
Hard Core Cartels which: 
 “calls upon countries to take two sorts of actions. First, countries are urged to 
ensure that their competition laws effectively halt and deter hard core cartel 
conduct. This requires that sanctions and investigatory powers are adequate and 
that exclusions and authorizations of what would otherwise be hard core cartels 
are both necessary and no broader than necessary to achieve their overriding 
policy objectives. Second, the recommendation urges countries to cooperate with 
one another in enforcing their laws against cartels. The Recommendation then sets 
forth several principles and practices that contribute to effective co-operation in 
the anti-cartel effort. The Recommendation…also invites non-Member countries 
to associate themselves with it.”
9  
One potential payoff from this initiative is that it may strengthen the deterrent 
value of national cartel enforcement efforts.  This , in turn, may result in cartels 
                                                 
7 Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 6 and CONNOR, supra note 5. 
8 The definition of a hard core cartel is, “an anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive concerted 
practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive 
tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, 
suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce;” according to the OECD’s Recommendation Concerning 
Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels at  
http://www.oecd.org//daf/clp/Recommendations/Rec9com.htm. 
9 Hard Core Cartels – A Contribution by the OECD Secretariat, OECD, 3 (2002).  
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raising prices less in jurisdictions where such efforts are perceived to be stronger.
10 It 
is an interesting research question, therefore, whether cartels that were prosecuted in 
the 1990s did in fact discriminate across jurisdictions on the basis of the deterrent 
value of their anti-cartel laws. Furthermore, after a few more years have passed, it 
would be interesting to see if any pattern of discrimination by cartel members has 
changed as a result of national legislative changes which may well, in part, have 
resulted from consultations and discussions at the OECD.  
Identifying the extent to which international cartels influence market outcomes 
is also important for assessing a number of proposals advanced by members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The membership of the WTO, which is much 
broader than that of the OECD and includes many economies without competition 
laws, must decide in September 2003 at its next Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, 
Mexico, whether and upon what terms negotiations can proceed on incorporating new 
disciplines on competition policy into WTO agreements. Moreover, the WTO’s 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy has held a 
number of discussions on international cartels and on the merits of adopting 
multilateral rules on these matters. Advocates of such rules, which include the 
European Union, point to the benefits of adopting effective anti-cartel laws. 
Opponents are concerned about the implementation costs of competition laws and 
wonder whether enforcement actions by OECD nations against their own firms who 
engage in cartelization abroad is a preferable alternative to making developing 
economies adopt their own anti-cartel laws.
11 It is, of course, an empirical question as 
to the extent to which the damage done by international cartels is reduced by the 
adoption of, or the strengthening of, national cartel enforcement regimes. 
Furthermore, even if such cartels were highly responsive to changes in cartel 
enforcement regimes, one would still want to compare the benefits that accrue from 
such steps with the associated implementation costs. As noted above, this paper will 
present evidence that is pertinent to such a cost benefit analysis for nine economies in 
Western Europe and Latin America. 
 
 
                                                 
10 This is in addition to the effect that greater deterrence may have on the incentive to form a cartel in 





3.  A Brief Account of The International Vitamins Cartel 
The purpose here is to provide a brief account of the vitamins cartel, and not to 
repeat the detailed renditions that can be found elsewhere.
12 This cartel has been 
described as “wheels within wheels” by Connor, principally because it comprised of a 
series of inter-related conspiracies to manipulate the markets of at least eight vitamins 
and four other chemical compounds. 
The cartel started in 1989 when two European vitamins manufacturers—
Roche and BASF—agreed to gradually increase the price of vitamins A and E and to 
a geographic division of the world’s markets for these two substances.
13 Roche and 
BASF controlled over seventy percent of sales in these markets and subsequently 
successfully co-opted their principal rivals, Rhone-Poulenc and Eisai. By 1991, these 
four companies essentially controlled the world price for vitamins A and E; a situation 
they were able to sustain until 1999 when the conspiracy was prosecuted by the US 
antitrust authorities. 
The conspirators’ success encouraged them to further the scope of the cartel to 
include other vitamins and other producers. By the end of the 1990s, twenty two 
manufacturers had at one time been a part of the twelve “wheels” (cartels) within the 
overall vitamins conspiracy.
14 So extensive was the price fixing within these markets 
that the European Commission branded the entire vitamins industry a single 
conspiracy.
15 Table 1 lists the duration of eight such “wheels”. It is noteworthy that 
five of these conspiracies lasted until 1998, potentially distorting international 
markets throughout almost the entire 1990s. In contrast, the cartel in vitamins B1, B6, 
and folic acid fell apart in 1994, largely as a result of competition from Chinese 
exporters that were not members of the cartel.  
In late 1998, Rhone-Poulenc sought leniency for its participation in the 
vitamins cartel. It has been argued that Rhone-Poulenc’s decision to seek leniency 
was prompted by the earlier indictment by the US authorities of Lonza for the latter’s 
participation in the vitamins B3 cartel. Another factor may well have been the US 
                                                                                                                                            
11 B. M. Hoekman & P. Mavroidis, Economic Development, Competition Policy and the WTO, 
WORLD BANK (2002). 
12 See CONNOR, supra note 5 and see also First supra note 4. 
13 See CONNOR, supra note 5, at 305-6. 
14 See CONNOR, supra note 5.   
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authorities well publicized investigation into the lysine and citric acid cartels, which 
included scrutiny of firms that also produced vitamins.
16 
Table 2 lists the names and location of the headquarters of the sixteen firms 
that, according to US Federal indictments in 1999, participated in the vitamins 
conspiracy.
17 This subsequent American enforcement action resulted in fines of $10.5 
million, $5 million, $500 million, $225 million, $72 million, $40 million, $25 million, 
$13 million, and $2 million for Lonza, Chinook, Hoffman-La Roche, BASF, Takeda, 
Eisai, Daiichi, Degussa, and Reilly/Vitachem, respectively. 
The European Commission’s (EC’s) investigation into this cartel’s activities 
revealed a slightly different set of cartel members and estimates of each wheel’s 
duration (see Table 3). Four additional companies were found to have participated in 
this cartel: Kongo Chemical Co. (headquartered in Japan), Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
(headquartered in the Netherlands), Sumitomo (headquartered in Japan), and Tanabe 
(headquartered in Japan.) The EC enforcement action resulted in the following fines 
for nine firms: Hoffman-La Roche (462 million euros), BASF (296.16 million euros), 
Takeda (37.06 million euros), Eisai (13.23 million euros), Daiichi (23.4 million 
euros), Merck (9.24 million euros), Aventis (5.04 million euros), Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals (9.1 million euros) and Takeda (37.06 million euros).
18 
This account would be incomplete without some mention of the role that 
Chinese exporters are said to have played in disrupting some of the wheels that made 
up the vitamins cartel.
19 Chinese firms remained outside the cartel and their exports of 
vitamins and polyvitamins surged after 1991 (see Figure 1). These exports rose from 
just under $100 million in 1990 to nearly $350 million in 1995, before falling back to 
approximately $250 million in 1997, and rising sharply to over $350 million in 
2000.
20 (All of these import values were measured in year 2000 US dollars.)  It has 
been claimed that Chinese exports were an important factor in the breakdown in 1994 
of the cartel in Vitamins B1 and B6 and in folic acid.
21As will become clear later, in 
estimating the effect of the vitamins cartel’s formation on value of vitamins exported 
                                                                                                                                            
15  See EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2001. 
16 See CONNOR, supra note 5, at 368-9. 
17 See United States Department of Justice Press Releases (1999-2000). 
18 See the EC Competition Policy Newsletter (2001). 
19 See CONNOR, supra note 5 at 306. 
20 The source of this data on Chinese exports of vitamins is the Statistics Canada World Trade Analyser 
Database. Product line number 5411 in this database refers to trade in vitamins and polyvitamins. 
21 See CONNOR, supra note 5 at 306.  
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from countries where the conspirators maintained their headquarters, this paper 
attempts to control for the effect of Chinese vitamins exports. 
 
4.  Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implementation 
In this section the theoretical rationale for the analysis of the vitamins cartel’s 
effects on international trade flows and the manner in which the empirical analysis 
was implemented is described. 
4.1  Effect of Cartelization on Prices and Total Revenues or Sales 
Theoretical analyses of cartel behavior invariably focus on these conspiracies’ 
effects on the prices charged to buyers, rather than on the effects on total revenues (or 
total sales) of the cartel members.
22 In our case this emphasis is unfortunate as 
international trade data on the price of vitamins is much more scarce than data on the 
total value of purchases by buyers located in an economy from firms located in 
another economy. With an assumption of the price elasticity of the good in question, 
one can draw out the implications of a cartel’s decision to raise prices in a market for 
the value of total sales by cartel members in that market. In fact, if the demand for a 
good is price inelastic then an increase in price will generate an increase in total 
revenues.
 23 What is more, as quantity demanded falls when price rises, one can also 
conclude that the percentage increase in total revenues that results from the formation 
of the cartel bounds from below the price increase that is caused by the conspiracy. 
4.2  Establishing a Benchmark for Trade Flows in the Absence of 
Cartelization 
The last sub-section established how total sales in a market—be it domestic or 
foreign—are distorted by the creation of a cartel. This begs the question of what 
benchmark level of sales would have prevailed in the absence of the cartel. In the 
international trade context, such a benchmark is important as it establishes what the 
exports of one nation’s firms to another nation’s buyers would have been in the 
absence of the cartel. Fortunately, the study of such bilateral trade flows is well 
advanced in research in international trade and provides an empirically-
implementable benchmark. 
                                                 
22 It is straightforward to show that the change in consumer surplus caused by the cartel’s formation is 
(in magnitude) larger than the increase in total revenues of the cartel members. Therefore, any 
estimates of the changes in the total value of sales of the cartelized product in a given market will also 
provide a lower bound on the harm done by the cartel’s formation to consumers in that market. 
23 For a discussion of the price inelasticity of the demand for vitamins see CONNOR, supra note 5.  
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One of the few—perhaps the only—robust empirical regularity in the analysis 
of international trade flows is known as the gravity equation. This equation relates the 
total value of one nation’s imports from another nation positively to the levels of 
national income of both nations and negatively to the distance between them.
24 Over 
the last twenty five years our understanding of the theoretical underpinning of the 
gravity equation has deepened
25 and empirical analyses of this equation have become 
more sophisticated.
26 What follows draws upon this substantial body of research into 
bilateral trade flows. Specifically, this paper adopts a standard formulation of the 
gravity equation. Denote: 
 
v
ij M   As the total value of country i’s imports of vitamins (v)  
from country j. 
v
j y   As the total value of country j’s production of vitamins (v). 
i Y   As country i’s national income or gross domestic product. 
j Y   As country j’s national income or gross domestic product. 
W Y   As the world’s total income or gross product. 
ij M   As the total value of all country i’s imports from nation j. 
 
Following Anderson’s research
27, the initial theoretical pioneer on the gravity 
equation, in the absence of barriers to international trade flows, with balanced trade in 
each nation, and each country’s buyers have identical and homothetic preferences, 

















                                                 
24 The analogy to the determinants of the force between two masses in the physical sciences is 
deliberate. 
25 See James A. Anderson, A Theroetical Foundation for the Gravity Equation, AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW, 69, 1979 at 106-111. See E. HELPMAN & P. KRUGMAN, MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE (1985). See A. V. DEARDORFF, Determinanats of Bilateral 
Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical World? in THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (J. A. Frankel, eds., University of Chicago Press 1998). See J. Eaton & S. Kortum, 
Technology, Geography, and Trade, ECONOMETRICA at http://econ.bu.edu/eaton/tgt501.pdf.  
26 See D. Hummels & J. Levinsohn, Monopolistic Competition and International Trade: Reconsidering 
the Evidence, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 110(3), August 1995 at 799-836. See S. J. 
Evenett & W. Keller, On Theories Explaining the Success of the Gravity Equation, JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, 110(2), April 2002 at 281-316. 



































M M  
(3) 
 
In this formulation, then, country i’s imports of vitamins from country j would rise 













 that is devoted to 
vitamins production rose by one percent also. Furthermore, any factor that leads to a 
one percent reduction in the overall bilateral level of trade between nations i and j 
will, in this formulation, lead to i’s imports of vitamins from j falling by the same 
percentage. As these predictions were derived in the absence of a cartel, they can form 
the basis of a benchmark for vitamins trade. 
 
Finally, taking logarithms of equation (3) yields 




ij Y y M M ln ln ln ln − + =   (4) 
 
which takes a convenient linear form amenable to econometric estimation. 
4.3 Econometric  Strategy 
This econometric strategy has two goals. First, by using data on international 
trade in vitamins before and after the vitamin cartel was formed, one can examine 
whether there is a systematic deviation of the value of bilateral imports of vitamins 
from that predicted in equation (4) above. As argued earlier, so long as the demand 
for vitamins is price inelastic and the conspiracy results in higher prices, then if all 
else is equal the observed level of the value of vitamins imports ( v
ij M ) should rise after 
the cartel’s formation. In essence, the analysis uses the intertemporal variation of the 
trade data in vitamins to identify the effect of the cartel’s formation. Second, it is 
possible to examine whether the impact of the cartel’s formation on the total value of 
nation’s vitamins imports ( v
ij M ) depends on whether that nation’s cartel enforcement 
regime is active. As will become clear below (when the data collection issues are  
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discussed) some nations’ enforcement agencies actively prosecuted cartels in the 
1990s. Moreover, some nations’ only established (what turned out to be) active 
enforcement authorities after the cartel’s formation, providing an opportunity to 
examine whether the imports of vitamins responded to the creation of an active 
enforcement authority. In the parlance of econometricians, the paper uses both cross-
sectional and intertemporal variation to identify the effects of cartel enforcement on 
the trade in cartelized vitamins. 
A time subscript (denoted by t) to each of the variables in equation (4) is 
added to indicate the year that each (data) observation refers to. Furthermore, to take 
account of the effect on cartelized imports of competition from Chinese sources, 
another independent variable, denoted  t C , is added which represents the total exports 
of Chinese vitamins to all destinations in a given year t. This variable proxies for the 
marginal costs of production of vitamins in China, with the idea being that lower 
marginal costs of production in China would translate into—holding other factors 
constant—higher Chinese exports to all foreign markets. 
Next four parameters were formed to discriminate between the years before 
and since the cartel was formed, and between those nations with active (A) active 
cartel enforcement regimes and those non-active enforcement regimes (NA). In our 
case, the first “wheel” of the vitamin cartel was formed in 1989, implying that 1990 
was the first complete year that vitamins trade was distorted by a cartel’s formation; 
and so 1990 was taken as the threshold year in which the cartel’s effects were first 
fully felt. One can, then, denote these four parameters by  1990 < A , 1990 > A ,  1990 < NA , and 
1990 > NA  respectively. These four parameters, along with variable  t C  and a random 
error term   ijt ε , could be added to equation (4) to form the following estimating 
equation: 
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where  , , , 3 2 1 β β β  and  4 β  are other parameters to be estimated also,  it I  takes a value of 
one if country i has an active enforcement regime in year t (where t is before 1990) 
and zero otherwise, and  *
it Ι  takes a value of one if country i has an active enforcement 
regime in year t (where t is after 1989) and zero otherwise. In this formulation an 
economy that implements an active cartel enforcement program in 1993 will, for  
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example, see  it I  take a value of zero throughout and  *
it Ι  takes a value for years before 
1993 and a value of one from 1993.  
If equation (5) were confronted with data and estimates of the 
parameters 1990 1990 1990 1990 , , , > > < < NA A NA A  recovered, then the estimated differences 
() 1990 1990 < > − NA NA  and () 1990 1990 < > − A A  would reveal whether the cartel’s formation leads 
import values to rise faster in nations without active cartel enforcement regimes than 
nations which do. Before discussing the econometric estimation in some detail, 
certain matters relating to data collection are described below. 
4.4 Data  Collection 
In section three above, the following eight economies where the headquarters 
of the members of the vitamins cartel are located were identified: Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Each of 
these economies exported substantial amounts of vitamins over the years 1985-1999. 
The goal is to examine how these trade flows were distorted—if at all—by the 
creation of the vitamins cartel. The vitamins exports of other nations which housed 
the overseas subsidiaries of the cartel members may also have been affected by the 
formation of this international conspiracy, but lacking detailed data on the location of 
such subsidiaries the analysis focused on the exports of vitamins by the eight 
economies listed above. 
So as to avoid assuming that the quantitative impact of each determinant of 
vitamins imports is the same in each continent, five distinct samples were formed; for 
potential vitamins importers in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America and the Caribbean, in 
Europe, and in Oceania. Statistics Canada’s World Trade Analyzer—which employs 
the United Nations’ classification of economies and customs territories—was used to 
identify all of the potential vitamins importers in each continent. Three further 
adjustments were made to the set of importers. First, taking each continental sample 
in turn, those economies that had in the year 2000 a population of less than 5 million 
people or a national income that was below US $5 billion were deleted.
28 The 
rationale for this step, which is often taken in studies using the gravity equation, was 
that such “smaller” economies—often island economies—tend to have 
unrepresentative trading patterns. 
                                                 
28 The World Bank’s World Development Indicators database was used to discern whether an economy 
was too “small” on either criterion.  
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Second, from each sample any economy was deleted that was formed from the 
breakup of two or more other economies during the years 1985 to 2000. This 
excluded many of the formerly Communist states, in particular those nations that 
emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. This second step is rationalized on the 
grounds that such newly-formed states would not have a complete set of observations 
on vitamins imports since 1985.
29 Third, the eight vitamins exporters were excluded 
from the set of potential importers on the grounds that the conspiracy may have 
included special market sharing provisions for sales in the “home” markets of the 
cartel members. These three adjustments resulted in the African, Asian, Latin 
American, European, and Oceania samples comprising 31, 20, 23, 15, and three 
importers respectively. The importer composition of each sample is given in Table 4.  
Each continental sample contains annual observations from 1985 to 1999 on 
the total value of vitamins imports by each importer from each of the eight vitamins 
exporters identified earlier. The value of each importer’s total purchases of vitamins 
can be downloaded from the World Trade Analyzer database, which is perhaps the 
most widely employed database on international trade flows used by empirical 
researchers into international trade. The four-digit code for the product line that 
corresponds to trade in “vitamins and polyvitamins” is 5411. No other product line at 
this level of disaggregation that included the word “vitamins” in the title or descriptor 
was found. Moreover, further disaggregation of trade in vitamins was not possible 
with this database. All of the recorded import values in this database are reported in 
current US dollars and, consequently, each observation was converted into a common 
base year, specifically year 2000 US dollars. This was accomplished by using the US 
price deflator for gross domestic product (the so-called US GDP price deflator), 
which is downloadable from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Data on each importing economies’ total purchases of all goods from a given 
exporter—that is, the observations on  ijt M  —were also obtained from the World 
Trade Analyzer database. The absence of production data for vitamins in the eight 
exporting economies necessitated the construction of a proxy variable for  v
jt y . As total 
sales of vitamins by firms located within a given nation j equals the sum of its total 
sales within nation j and its total sales abroad, the observed level of total vitamins 
                                                 
29 Another argument in favor of excluding such states is that market forces are likely to play a less 
important role in these economies than in countries which have not previously experienced  
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exports by economy j was used as a proxy for  v
jt y . Furthermore, for each nation i, we 
netted out economy i’s total imports of vitamins from j’s total annual exports of 
vitamins; so creating a proxy for  v
jt y  that is denoted by 
v
jt i y , − .
30 The final piece of 
international trade data collected was annual data on the total value of Chinese 
exports of vitamins, again obtained from the World Trade Analyzer database. 
Data on the gross domestic product (denoted GDP) of each exporter was taken 
from the World Development Indicators database. A full set of such GDP data was 
available for each vitamins exporter except Germany, where GDP data was only 
available after 1992. The Penn World Tables database was the source of the German 
GDP data before 1992 and, before reunification, only GDP data on West Germany 
was used.
31 
The last step in data collection was to identify those economies where there 
was some evidence of active cartel enforcement. For each importer listed in Table 4, 
the extensive number of submissions to the OECD’s 2001 and 2002 Global Forums 
on Competition were examined to see if there were any reported cases of cartel 
enforcement activity that resulted in fines or some other form of sanction being 
imposed, or in an order to cartel members to cease their conspiracy.
32 If there was 
such evidence then the importer is classified as having an active cartel enforcement 
regime in the years since 1985 or the year its anticartel law came into force, 
whichever is later. More specifically, three cases can be distinguished. First, in an 
economy where such enforcement activity was reported in OECD documentation and 
where the economy’s anti-cartel legislation came into force before 1990, the indicator 
variable  it I  switches from its default value of zero to one for every year since that 
                                                                                                                                            
communism.  
30 This adjustment is needed because the dependent variable in our econometric analysis—the value of 
nation i’s imports of vitamins from nation j in a given year t—is obviously a component of the total 
exports of vitamins by nation j to all destinations,  v
jt y .  
31 This widely used cross-country dataset can be accessed at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt. 
32 See the recent annual reports of the national competition authorities to the OECD’s Committee on 
Competition Law and Policy for evidence of cartel enforcement activity at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/Annual_reports/1999-00.htm. See documentation for the 2001 OECD 
Global Forum on Competition at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/GFC_October2001/. See 
documentation for the 2002 OECD Global Forum on Competition at 
  http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-20-
24303-0,00.html#title0. Technically, China does not have a competition law. However, measures to 
defraud the state—through bid rigging and alike—are illegal. To the extent that any vitamins imports 
were purchased by state or quasi-state bodies, then the activities of the international vitamins cartel 
may well constitute defrauding the state.  
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legislation came into force and the indicator variable  *
it Ι  takes a value of one for every 
year in the 1990s. Second, in an economy where evidence of cartel enforcement 
activity was found and where the economy’s anti-cartel legislation came into force 
during or since 1990, then the indicator variable  it I  takes a value of zero throughout 
and the indicator variable  *
it Ι  switches from its default value of zero to one for every 
year since the legislation came into force. The third case, where there is no evidence 
of cartel enforcement by an economy’s authorities, both indicator variables  it I  and  *
it Ι  
take a value of zero in every year. 
An example may clarify matters. According to OECD documentation, 
Romania completed at least two cartel enforcement actions during the years 1997 to 
2000. Given Romania passed her competition law in 1996 and that the law came into 
force on January 1, 1997, the algorithm above would set indicator variable  it I  to zero 
throughout and indicator variable  *
it Ι  to one in the year 1997 and for each year 
thereafter. 
There is one additional wrinkle. Those importers that are members of the 
European Union (EU)—or its predecessor the European Economic Community 
(EEC)—are treated slighted differently. Given Brussels’ increasingly tough line on 
cartel enforcement, a nation is said to fall under an active cartel enforcement regime 
in the year that it joined the EU or EEC. For those importers that joined the EC before 
1990, the indicator variable  it I  is set to one at the year of accession
33 and in every 
subsequent year until 1989. Furthermore, in this case, the indicator variable  *
it Ι  takes a 
value of one for 1990 and for each year after. For those importers that joined the EU 
or EEC (as appropriate) during or after 1990, the indicator variable  it I  is set to zero 
for each year before 1990 and the indicator variable  *
it Ι  switches from its default value 
of zero to one in the year of EEC/EU accession and for every year thereafter. Given 
that several European economies joined the EEC and the EU during the years 1985 to 
1999, the amount of commerce in vitamins that fell within the purview of Brussels-
based antitrust officials is likely to have expanded over time. This intertemporal 
variation will be useful in identifying the effects of active cartel enforcement on the 
value of vitamins imports into European nations. 
                                                 
33 Or in 1985, whichever is later. Recall each dataset begins in 1985 well after many nations had 
already joined the EEC.  
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Following the procedure outlined above, recent OECD documentation 
provides evidence that the following potential vitamins importers had engaged in 
cartel enforcement actions or had commerce which fell within the ambit of EC 
competition enforcement: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and Zambia. For these importers, then, the values of the indicator variables  it I and  *
it Ι  
took non-zero values at some point during the years 1985 to 1999. 
This investigation-based measure of the presence of an active cartel 
enforcement regime is not without its drawbacks. For instance, the binary nature of 
the indicator does not take into account the differences in the intensity of cartel 
enforcement efforts between those nations that do have active enforcement regimes. 
Probably the best defense of the indicators employed here is that they do discriminate 
between nations on the basis of whether any cartel enforcement activity is reported at 
all to the international antitrust community that attends or follows meetings at the 
OECD. Arguably, a national cartel enforcement regime is unlikely to have a strong 
deterrent effect if members of this community—some of whom advise corporations—
do not know of a regime’s record in tackling price-fixing conspiracies and the like. 
4.5 Estimation  Procedure 
In the last sub-section, five continental sub-samples were created, each 
comprising the bilateral exports of vitamins of the eight nations in which the 
headquarters of at least one cartel member was located. It might be tempting to 
confront equation (5) with data from each sample and use standard ordinary least 
squares techniques to recover the relevant parameters. However, this would ignore 
several important econometric issues. 
First, many of the observed levels of vitamins imports ( v
ijt M ) equal zero—
especially in the poorest importing nations. As the logarithm of zero is undefined, this 
would pose a considerable problem. Often, this problem is—to put it politely—
sidestepped by assuming that a dollar’s worth of imports actually occurred, which 
yields a defined value of the dependent variable—namely the logarithm of one (which 
equals zero.) However, there is something very unsatisfactory about assuming that a 
positive level of bilateral trade exists when the measured data reveals that it does not. 
Consequently, this paper takes another tack, preferring to eliminate those observations  
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with zero trade from the sample; arguing that the theory predicts positive levels of 
vitamins trade and that it is most likely—if ever—to fit the data in a setting where 
positive amounts of trade exist. This step—that of eliminating the zero trade 
observations—reduces the size of each continental sample considerably. 
The second econometric problem is that since vitamins imports ( v
ijt M ) are an 
element of total bilateral imports ( ijt M ), there must be a contemporaneous correlation 
between the error term  ijt ε  and  ijt M ; implying that ordinary least squares procedures 
will generate inconsistent estimates. To break this contemporaneous correlation the 
variable  ijt M  is lagged by one year, essentially creating the variable  1 − ijt M .
34 A similar 
but slightly different concern related to the variable  t C : here a reduction in the formal 
or informal trade barriers to vitamins might result in both an increase in country i’s 
vitamins imports from nation j and from China. This would induce a positive 
correlation between  ijt ε  and  t C , again potentially resulting in inconsistent estimates 
from ordinary least squares. To break this contemporaneous correlation,  t C  is lagged 
by one year, using data on last year’s total Chinese exports of vitamins to all export 
destinations,  1 − t C . 
As noted in the last subsection, our proxy for country j’s production of 
vitamins ( v
jt y ) is—in the absence of direct data on the production of vitamins—
country j’s total export of vitamins in year t (net of its vitamins exports) to country i. 
This variable too could be contemporaneously correlated with the error term, and so 
v
jt i y , −  is lagged by one year also. This is the third adjustment to equation (5). 
A final econometric concern is that the estimation results may be sensitive to 
outliers. This issue has been systematically explored in another gravity-equation 
related context
35—which also made extensive use of dummy variables—and it was 
found that the inclusion of outliers substantially affected the estimated parameters of 
interest. In that study only when the ten percent of the sample that had the largest (in 
absolute value) residuals were deleted was a semblance of parameter stability 
restored. The sample concern was explored here by trimming one percent, five 
                                                 
34 Furthermore, the value of the dependent variable in year (t-1) was subtracted from  1 − ijt M . Thus the 
variable  1 − ijt M  is the lagged value of all non-vitamins imports by nation i from nation j. 
35 S. J. Evenett, The Impact of Economic Sanctions on South African Exports, SCOTTISH JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol.49, No. 5, November 2002.  
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percent, and ten percent (and more) of each continental sample, and examining how 
stable the parameter estimates were as more and more outliers were removed. Only 
when the largest ten percent of each sample’s outliers were trimmed were the 
parameter estimates found to settle down. For this reason, the regression results 
presented below are from each continental sample after the data points that were in 
the top ten percentile of residuals (as measured in absolute value) were eliminated. In 
sum, each continental sample included observations on vitamins imports from 1986 to 
2000. The African, Asian, European, Latin American, and Oceania samples included 
1011, 1662, 1332, 1288, and 176 observations respectively. 
In the light of the foregoing remarks the econometric specification taken to 
each sample is: 
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This specification does not include a direct role for the distance between countries i 
and j, which is the traditional proxy for international transportation costs in gravity 
equation studies. However, it should be pointed out that higher levels of such costs 
would reduce total bilateral imports, so reducing  1 − ijt M . More generally, many time-
invariant and time-varying determinants of bilateral imports of vitamins (such as 
bilateral exchange rates and distance) will also affect total bilateral imports; and so 
the latter variable (ie.  1 − ijt M ) can act as a control for a number of potentially important 
determinants of vitamins imports. 
The econometric parameters for each continent are reported in Table 5. With 
the exception of the African sample, in which no country had an active cartel 
enforcement regime in the 1980s, a full set of parameters were estimated. It is 
noticeable that all three of the gravity-inspired control variables have the correct sign 
and are statistically significant. Moreover, the effect of Chinese vitamins exports on 
the value of sales of cartelized imports is uniformly negative. In Africa, a one percent 
increase in Chinese exports resulted in a 0.16 percent reduction in African imports of 
vitamins from each cartel member. The strength of the “discipline” imposed by 
Chinese exports on the vitamins cartel varies considerably across continental samples: 
in Oceania it is four times as strong as it is in Africa. This may reflect the fact that 
trade barriers are lower in Oceania than in Africa.  
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The parameter estimates for the European sample was found to be sensitive to 
the inclusion of the four Eastern European countries in the sample; namely, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Arguably the role that market forces played in 
determining imports of all goods—not just vitamins—may be less in Eastern 
European economies than in Western Europe, in which case pooling Eastern and 
Western European import data into the same sample may not be appropriate. For this 
reason the estimation results for a Western European sample (labeled Europe (West 
only)) and the full European sample (labeled Europe (West and East)) were reported. 
In discussing the econometric results for European nations, this paper refers to the 
Western European sample. 
4.6  Principal Empirical Findings 
The estimated parameters on the impact of the cartel’s formation on the total 
value of imports vary considerably across continents and within continents; the latter 
in systematic ways. To facilitate interpretation, for each continent the implied 
percentage increase in the total value of vitamins imports that occurs in an economy 
that did not have an active cartel enforcement regime before 1990 and since 1990 is 
reported in Table 6. The comparable increase for those economies with active cartel 
enforcement regimes is also reported in Table 6. In the Asian, Western European, and 
Latin American samples a distinct pattern emerges: the formation of the vitamins 
cartel is associated with a greater increase in the value of total imports in those 
economies that do not have active cartel enforcement regimes. In the case of Latin 
America, those economies without such regimes saw the value of their vitamins 
imports rise by over 50 percent after the cartel was formed. In contrast, those Latin 
economies with active cartel enforcement regimes found the total value of their 
vitamins exports rise by less than 40 percent. More generally, assuming the price 
inelasticity of demand for vitamins is comparable in both types of Latin American 
economy, then the empirical results presented here support the proposition that the 
vitamins cartel raised prices more in those Asian, Western European, and Latin 
American economies that do not have active cartel enforcement regimes. 
Oceania is the only sample where having an active cartel enforcement regime 
was found to have raised the total value of an economy’s imports of vitamins more 
than not having such a regime. This sample is much smaller than the others (with 176 
observations compared to 1011 observations in the African sample, the next smallest 
dataset) and contains data on the importing patterns of only three economies:  
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Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. Moreover, the estimated parameters 
for non-active cartel enforcement regimes were identified from only four 
observations; all from one importer, Papua New Guinea. It is quite likely that some 
other factor—such as political instability in this one country in the 1990s—may have 
reduced imports and has influenced these parameter estimates. Consequently, it is 
doubtful that this finding is representative of the determinants of importing patterns in 
countries other than Papua New Guinea. In sum, in the three continental samples with 
a sizeable number of importing economies and where comparisons between those 
economies that had active cartel enforcement regimes and those that did not were 
possible, it is possible to find that the formation of the vitamins cartel was associated 
with a greater increase in imports above a commonly-used empirical benchmark for 
bilateral trade flows. 
Overall, these empirical findings provide support for the contention that strong 
cartel enforcement regimes have a deterrent value. Of course, such regimes may 
reduce the probability of a cartel being formed in the first place. That is not the effect 
being considered here. Rather, once a cartel is formed, the presence of a strong 
enforcement regime limits the damage that a cartel is willing to reek. Overcharges 
tend to be lower in such regimes—even if the cartel is never actually prosecuted. The 
question is how much lower, but first estimates of the overcharges paid by each 
economy on their vitamins imports are presented. 
Table 7 reports in year 2000 US dollars the overcharges paid by 90 importing 
economies during the years 1990 to 1999. The overcharges were calculated using the 
estimated impacts of the cartel’s formation on the value of imports that were reported 
in Table 5 and take into account the fact that some economies may have only begun to 
actively enforce anticartel measures during the 1990s.
36 Since countries differ 
considerably in the amount of vitamins that they imported throughout the 1990s, it 
should not be surprising that the estimated overcharges vary across economies. 
Having said that, in eight economies the estimated overcharges exceeded one hundred 
                                                 
36 For those Asian economies with active enforcement regimes in the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
parameter estimates in Table 4 suggest that the formation of the vitamins cartel would have been 
associated with a fall in the total value of vitamins imports. In principle there is nothing anomalous 
with this finding especially if the punishments for cartelization are very severe. However, so that the 
estimates of overcharges do not depend in any way on this particular econometric finding, the 
overcharges were calculated for these Asian economies assuming the formation of the vitamins cartel 
had no effect on the total value of vitamins imports into those economies. This essentially sets to zero 
the estimated overcharges in Korea, which is therefore omitted from Table 6.  
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million US dollars. What is more, in 35 more jurisdictions the estimated overcharges 
exceeded ten million US dollars. In total, the estimated overcharges on vitamins paid 
by buyers in these 90 economies equaled 2709.87 million US dollars; that is, just 
under two and three quarter billion US dollars. Such overcharges represent a sizeable 
transfer of rent between constituents of the world economy. 
The next step was to estimate how much larger an economy’s overcharges 
would have been if it did not have an active cartel enforcement regime. This provides 
an estimate of one of the savings that accrue to economies with such regimes. This 
calculation was performed for the Western European economies in the sample and for 
four Latin American economies (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) where there was 
some evidence—in OECD documentation—of active cartel enforcement in the 1990s. 
The additional overcharges that would have resulted if these economies did not have 
an active cartel enforcement regime are reported in Table 8. The annual estimated 
increase in overcharges on vitamins is reported in the third column and varies from 
$700,000 in Peru to over $30 million in Italy. For as many economies listed in this 
table as possible, data on the central government’s annual outlays on its competition 
enforcement agency was collected; a figure that can include spending activities other 
than cartel enforcement also.
37 Such data was found for nine economies and is 
reported in the fourth column of Table 8. Comparing columns three and four one can 
calculate on average how many cents of savings (from lower overcharges on this 
single cartel) resulted from each dollar of government spending on competition 
enforcement. The savings-per-dollar-spent varied considerably across economies, 
from seven cents per dollar in Peru to over 4800 cents per dollar in Brazil! Even in an 
intermediate case, such as Mexico, each dollar spent on its competition enforcement 
agency resulted in a 46 cent saving on overcharges from the vitamins cartel alone. 
The results in Table 8 for the members of the European Union must be 
interpreted with care as the bulk of enforcement actions against international cartels 
comes from EC-led initiatives and not from national capitals. For each of the 
European economies listed in Table 8 (above the line labeled “memorandum”), the 
estimated additional overcharges was compared with the annual cost of the country’s 
                                                 
37 It was not possible to find the government outlays on anticartel enforcement activities alone. The 
principal source for these outlays were governments own reports to the OECD’s Committee on 
Competition Law and Policy as analzsed in R. W. Hahn & A. Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust at 
Table 2. In the cases of Brazil and Peru the data on government outlays was taken from the webpages 
of the relevant competition authority.     
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national competition authority or authorities. To provide a larger Europe-wide 
perspective, the total additional overcharges paid by the ten European Union members 
listed in Table 8 was calculated. The additional overcharges that would have been 
paid in the absence of the prevailing cartel enforcement regimes totaled 1270.8 
million US dollars; a figure that is reported in the bottom row of Table 8. These 
savings were compared to the sum of available data on these ten economies’ own 
governmental outlays on their national competition authorities plus the cost of 
running the competition enforcement agency in Brussels. This sum amounted to 127.5 
million US dollars at the end of the 1990s. Consequently, the annual savings-per-
dollar spent on such European competition enforcement was 96 cents.
38 That is, the 
strength of the deterrent of European cartel enforcement in the 1990s was such that 
the reduction in overcharges by a single cartel alone would have “paid” for a 
substantial proportion of state outlays on competition policy enforcement in Europe. 
It is worth noting that the above average savings-per-dollar spent calculations 
clearly do not represent a full cost benefit analysis of the effects of robust cartel 
enforcement. The above calculation takes into account all government outlays on 
national competition policy enforcement, not just on anticartel activities. Moreover, 
our calculation of the savings only includes those from one (admittedly particularly 
large) cartel. These factors skew the calculation towards finding lower societal 
benefits from cartel enforcement than is actually the case. Furthermore, a full cost 
benefit analysis would take into account the benefits to society of deterring the 
formation of cartels in the first place. Working in the other direction are the costs to 
society of any unwarranted harassment—or even outright corruption—that may result 
from activities by officials that purport to be cartel enforcement. It is not the 
contention of this paper that these costs are substantial or that harassment and 
corruption are rife, merely that such effects are not part of the calculus developed 
                                                 
38 In interpreting this finding two additional points should be borne in mind. First, the total additional 
overcharges were calculated with data for only 10 out of the 15 EU members. (Four of the other five 
EU members had at least one cartel member’s headquartered inside their borders and so are the 
exporters of vitamins in our empirical analysis. Plus, Belgium and Luxembourg’s international trade 
data are reported together and so Luxembourg was effectively treated as an exporter in our empirical 
analysis.) Arguably, the inclusion of additional overcharges by vitamins buyers in these five other EU 
economies would have raised the total savings to European purchasers from strong cartel enforcement. 
Second, and working in the opposite direction, the calculation of the total government outlays on 
competition enforcement at the national and supranational level does not include outlays on the 
Austrian, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, or Spanish national competition authorities. We could not find 




39 Overall, then, in economies where corruption and harassment are not issues, 
the calculus presented here will almost certainly constitute an underestimate of the 
benefits of strong cartel enforcement regimes. 
 
5. Conclusion   
In the last fifteen years many nations enacted competition laws for the first 
time or sought to revive moribund competition enforcement agencies. As these 
agencies begin to tackle perceived anticompetitive practices in the private sector, it is 
reasonable to expect that there will be greater scrutiny of the costs and benefits of 
competition policy enforcement. The recent enforcement actions against the 
international vitamins cartels provides one lens through which to assess the magnitude 
of the potential benefits of cartel enforcement, one important component of national 
competition laws. An econometric evaluation—continent by continent—of the 
determinants of international trade in vitamins before and after this cartel’s formation 
supports the contention that this cartel inflicted greater harm—in the form of 
overcharges—on those economies without active cartel enforcement regimes. What is 
more, in seven out of nine economies considered here—in particular, in Europe—the 
reduction in overcharges cartel brought about by the presence of an active cartel 
enforcement regime was large enough that it covered a substantial proportion of the 
entire cost of competition policy enforcement. For example, the estimates presented 
here suggest that the annual reduction in overcharges in several European nations 
during the 1990s was equivalent to 96 percent of the total cost of enforcing 
competition policy in those nations (including the costs of running Brussels-based 
competition policy.) Without suggesting that such calculations constitute a full cost-
benefit analysis of competition policy, they do suggest that one important element of 
the latter has paid substantial dividends during the 1990s.  
The overcharges on vitamins imports by 90 economies during the years 1990 
to 1999 was found to be US $2709.87 million; that is, just under two and three quarter 
billion US dollars. This amount is almost certainly an underestimate of the total 
overcharges on all vitamins transactions during the cartel’s duration for two reasons. 
First, only overcharges on imports were considered here—not overcharges on purely 
                                                 
39 In this respect it is interesting to note that number of current and former World Bank officials who 
claim that one of the reasons why developing economies should not enact anticartel legislation or  
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intra-national transactions. Second, the calculations presented here do not include any 
overcharges that might have occurred in the eight economies where the headquarters 
of the cartel members were located. Since these eight economies included the three of 
the world’s largest economies—the United States, Germany, and Japan—it would be 
surprising if the estimated overcharges presented here are a fraction of the worldwide 
total overcharges. 
  This paper’s empirical findings are particularly relevant to the debate as to 
whether WTO members should adopt cartel laws as part of a potential multilateral 
agreement on competition policy as it implies that nations—both developing and 
industrial—without well functioning cartel enforcement bodies are likely to be 
especially harmed by private international cartels. It is worth bearing in mind that 
these cartels take advantage of the very moves towards open borders that multilateral 
trade reforms seek to encourage. This paper’s findings suggest that the deterrent value 
of a nation’s rigorous cartel enforcement regime may go a long way to paying for 
itself by reducing the overcharges that existing and future cartels are likely to charge 
buyers within the nation’s borders. These reductions in overcharges are in addition to 
any benefits that accrue from deterring the formation of cartels in the first place. Since 
the estimated benefits from rigorous national cartel enforcement are—on the basis of 
this analysis of just one international cartel—substantial, it would seem that the often-
raised concern about the costs of implementing a multilateral commitment to enact 
and enforce a national cartel law may well be misplaced. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
enforce such legislation is that it opens the possibility of corruption by officials and harassment of the 
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Source: Connor, 2001, p.307 
 
Table 2: List of Companies and the Location of Their Headquarters that were Mentioned in 

























List of Cartels Uncovered in the EC Investigation and the Participants in Those Cartels  
 
 
Duration (*)  Vitamin Participants 
From To 






Vitamin E  Roche, BASF, Rhone-





Vitamin B1 (Thiamine)  Roche, Takeda, BASF  January 1991  June 1994 
Vitamin B2 (Riboflavin)  Roche, BASF, Takeda  January 1991  September 
1995 
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  Roche, BASF, Daiichi  January 1991  February 
1999 
Vitamin B6  Roche, Takeda, Daiichi  January 1991  June 1994 
Folic Acid (B)  Roche, Takeda, Kongo, 
Sumika 
January 1991  June 1994 
Vitamin C  Roche, BASF, Takeda, 
Merck 
January 1991  August 1995 
Vitamin D3  Roche, BASF, Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals, Rhone-
Poulenc (Aventis) 
January 1994  June 1998 
Vitamin H (Biotin)  Roche, Merck, Lonza, 
Sumitomo, Tanabe, BASF 
October 1991  April 1994 




Carotinioids  Roche, BASF  May 1993  December 
1998 
Note: (*) The duration of each company’s participation in a cartel need not necessarily be the 
same.   
 




Table 4: Importing Economies in Each Continental Sample                   
 
Continental sample 
Africa Latin  America 
 
Asia Europe  Oceania 
Algeria 
 
Argentina Bangladesh  Austria  Australia 
Angola Bolivia  Cambodia  Bulgaria  New  Zealand 
Benin Brazil China  Denmark 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Burkina Faso  Chile  Hong Kong  Finland   
Cameroon Colombia  India  Greece   
Chad Costa  Rica  Indonesia  Hungary   
Congo 
Dominican 
Republic Iran  Ireland 
 
Cote D'Ivoire  Ecuador  Israel  Italy   
Egypt El  Salvador Jordan  Norway   
Ethiopia Guatemala  Korea  Poland   
Gabon Haiti  Laos  Portugal   




Guinea Jamaica  Malaysia Spain   
Kenya Mexico Nepal Sweden   
Madagascar Nicaragua  Pakistan  United  Kingdom   
Malawi Panama  Philippines    
Mali Paraguay  Saudi  Arabia    
Mauritius Peru Singapore     
Morocco Trinidad  Tobago Syria     
Mozambique Venezuela  Thailand     





Rwanda  Yemen     
S e n e g a l       
South  Africa      
Tanzania      
Togo      
T u n i s i a       
Uganda      
Z a m b i a       










Europe (West and  
East)
Europe (West only) Latin America Oceania
Enforcer  ?  n.e. -4.3739 (-3.9041) -1.6375 (-1.4204)  -2.2260 (-1.7467) 5.1366 (4.5902) 1.0646 (0.4257)
Non-enforcer  ?  2.1203 (1.4130) -5.1017 (-4.6546) -1.6496 (-1.4351)  -2.9372 (-2.3066) 4.6582 (4.1744) 0.6614 (0.2499)
Enforcer  ?  3.5174 (2.1632) -4.5234 (-3.829) -1.5374 (-1.2241)  -2.066 (-1.5133) 5.4591 (4.5900) 1.6876 (0.6356)
Non-enforcer  ?  2.5477 (1.5886) -4.7613 (-4.0652) -1.7888 (-1.4864)  -2.5172 (-1.8945) 5.0836 (4.2642) 0.1981 (0.0699)
+ 
0.8448 (30.5812) 0.6664 (33.7044) 0.6920 (33.9013)  0.8616 (32.1887) 0.9236 (40.8392) 1.0912 (16.5695)
- 
-0.4716 (-11.0261) -0.2478 (-8.5971) -0.3261 (-13.5715)  -0.3884 (-14.5647) -0.8556 (-26.7847) -0.4801 (-6.1209)
+ 
0.4690 (14.5036) 0.7836 (34.1105) 0.8263 (37.5782)  0.8558 (35.0157) 1.0273 (38.3862) 0.7767 (17.0237)
- 
-0.1639 (-2.2588) -0.2051 (-3.7587) -0.3230 (-5.6170)  -0.4392 (-6.9414) -0.3110 (-5.6505) -0.6329 (-5.5073)
1011 1662 1333 1030 1288 176
0.5472 0.6315 0.7004  0.7377 0.7385 0.8334
Table 5: Parameter Estimates by Continental Sample 
Note: n.e. implies that the relevant parameter could not be estimated in the sample
Constants for pre- 
1990 
Constants for post- 
1990 
Last year's total imports from  
exporter 
Proxy for exporter's total vitamins  
production 
Exporter's national income 
Number of observations (without outliers) 
R-squared 
Parameter 
Last year's total vitamins exports  
from China 




Africa Asia Europe (West only)  Latin America  Oceania 
did not have a cartel law  
before or after 1990 
53.3 40.1 52.1  53.0 -38.1
did have a cartel law  
before an after 1990 
n.e. -13.9 17.4  38.1 86.4
Notes: 
Table 6: Implied Growth Rates of Total Imports after The Cartel's Formation, by Continental Sample. 
Continental sample  Implied estimated  
percentage growth in the  
total value of imports of  
an economy that… 
1. As none of the African economies whose cartel enforcement was reported to the OECD had a cartel law before 1990 the implied  
change in imports that is associated with the formation of the vitamins cartel cannot be calculated from the estimated parameters. 
2. The large reduction in vitamins imports after 1990 that is found in Oceania in economies without a cartel law is computed from  
parameter estimates that were themselves identified with two data points (out of a sample of 176 data points.) Prudence suggests that







paid on  
vitamins  
imports during  
the conspiracy 
Total value of 
imports during 
years when 
importer did not 
have a cartel 
law




have a cartel 
law
Overcharges  
paid on  
vitamins  
imports during  
the conspiracy 




not have a 
cartel law





Economies with evidence of cartel prosecutions in OECD documents Economies with no evidence of cartel prosecutions in OECD documents
         Brazil  183.37  0.00 665.19 (continued)
         Australia  154.70  0.00 333.63          Guatemala 10.41  30.05 0.00
         Italy  153.78  0.00 1040.09          Nigeria 7.00  20.14 0.00
         Mexico  151.98  111.33 411.38          Bangladesh 6.42  22.26 0.00
         UK  147.64  0.00 998.57          Syria 5.79  20.08 0.00
         Denmark  138.49  0.00 936.62          Paraguay 4.57  13.18 0.00
         South Africa  99.93  173.56 39.57          Tunisia 4.45  12.80 0.00
         Spain  91.89  0.00 621.47          Vietnam 4.38  15.19 0.00
         China  77.61  72.35 56.73          Costa Rica 3.82  11.03 0.00
         Austria  44.22  88.34 94.16          Bolivia 3.45  9.97 0.00
         Chile  38.43  0.00 139.41          Zimbabwe 3.41  9.80 0.00
         Poland  31.50  0.00 213.07          Lebanon 3.11  10.77 0.00
         New Zealand  29.26  0.00 63.11          Dominican Republic 3.07  8.86 0.00
         Hungary  24.71  48.73 54.11          El Salvador 2.70  7.80 0.00
         Sweden  23.47  36.10 75.03          Jordan 2.54  8.82 0.00
         Norway  19.27  34.85 49.47          Jamaica 2.11  6.09 0.00
         Romania  18.99  48.36 16.29          Kenya 1.79  5.16 0.00
         Peru  18.91  3.32 64.43          Ghana 1.32  3.81 0.00
         Ireland  17.76  0.00 120.10          Nepal 1.21  4.21 0.00
         Finland  16.44  28.06 46.08          Nicaragua 1.20  3.46 0.00
         Greece  13.73  0.00 92.83          Cote D'Ivoire 0.88  2.53 0.00
         Portugal  12.77  0.00 86.39          Senegal 0.82  2.36 0.00
         Bulgaria  5.04  2.87 27.47          Trinidad Tobago 0.81  2.33 0.00
         Zambia  0.06  0.14 0.01          Panama 0.68  1.96 0.00
         Madagascar 0.60  1.73 0.00
Economies with no evidence of cartel prosecutions in OECD documents          Ethiopia 0.59  1.69 0.00
         Singapore  245.22  849.93 0.00          Yemen 0.58  2.02 0.00
         Hong Kong  178.48  618.61 0.00          Mali 0.49  1.41 0.00
         Turkey  82.89  287.31 0.00          Mauritius 0.46  1.33 0.00
         Thailand  78.45  271.91 0.00          Cameroon 0.39  1.12 0.00
         Argentina  73.83  213.08 0.00          Cambodia 0.28  0.98 0.00
         Colombia  54.95  158.60 0.00          Benin 0.22  0.63 0.00
         Indonesia  48.72  168.85 0.00          Togo 0.19  0.53 0.00
         Venezuela  45.32  130.81 0.00          Tanzania 0.16  0.46 0.00
         Iran  44.25  153.35 0.00          Haiti 0.11  0.33 0.00
         Egypt  38.49  110.66 0.00          Angola 0.11  0.33 0.00
         Pakistan  36.82  127.62 0.00          Gabon 0.09  0.27 0.00
         Israel  32.30  111.97 0.00          Niger 0.07  0.19 0.00
         Philippines  29.58  102.53 0.00          Congo 0.06  0.19 0.00
         Honduras  25.87  74.65 0.00          Burkina Faso 0.06  0.17 0.00
         India  25.71  89.12 0.00          Malawi 0.05  0.13 0.00
         Malaysia  22.94  79.50 0.00          Rwanda 0.04  0.12 0.00
         Ecuador  14.82  42.78 0.00          Uganda 0.03  0.10 0.00
         Saudi Arabia  13.11  45.43 0.00          Guinea 0.03  0.09 0.00
         Morocco  12.44  35.77 0.00          Laos 0.03  0.10 0.00
         Algeria  11.09  31.88 0.00          Chad 0.01  0.04 0.00
         Mozambique 0.00  0.01 0.00
Notes:  
1. Total value of overcharges for imports into these 90 economies is 2709.87 million US dollars. 
2. This table does not include overcharges for Papua New Guinea or for Korea.
Table 7: Estimated Overcharges from The International Vitamins Cartel, 1990-1999 in Year 2000 US Dollars  
Millions of US dollars Millions of US dollars








         Austria  27.96 2.80 44.22
         Brazil  72.09 7.21 0.15 48.06  183.37
         Chile  15.11 1.51 38.43
         Denmark  278.11 27.81 8.70 3.20  138.49
         Finland  13.68 1.37 3.40 0.40  16.44
         Greece  27.56 2.76 13.73
         Ireland  35.66 3.57 1.60 2.23  17.76
         Italy  308.83 30.88 153.78
         Mexico  44.59 4.46 9.70 0.46  151.98
         Norway  14.69 1.47 7.70 0.19  19.27
         Peru  6.98 0.70 10.05 0.07  18.91
         Portugal  25.65 2.57 12.77
         Spain  184.53 18.45 91.89
         Sweden  22.28 2.23 7.30 0.31  23.47
         UK  296.51 29.65 46.60 0.64  147.64
            Sum of entries for EU members above  1220.78 122.08 127.50 0.96  660.19
Note: 
The cost of the European Commission's competition enforcement authority was added to the line "EU members above." 
Table 8: Estimating the Average Savings-Per-Dollar Spent on Competition 
Memorandum: 
Economy 
Additional overcharges in the 
absence of a cartel law (millions of 
US dollars)
Annual cost of 
competition 
authority   (1999-
2000) 
Return on each  
dollar spent: ratio  
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